Justice Clarence Thomas expressed frustration in a dissenting statement regarding a recent Supreme Court decision allowing a new trial for David M. Smith, an Ohio man convicted of attempted murder nearly a decade ago. The case revolves around Smith’s conviction, which was based on an identification made by the victim, Quortney Tolliver, under questionable circumstances.
Smith had been sentenced to 22 years in prison in 2016 for attempting to murder Tolliver with a hammer. The identification was made after Tolliver, who had suffered head trauma and was in a medically induced coma, was shown a photo array. Initially, Tolliver did not recognize Smith, but after further questioning by police, she made an identification. However, the police detective, Lieutenant Greg Johnson, had told Tolliver that Smith was her attacker and provided numerous details about his violent nature. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found this identification to be unduly suggestive and coercive, violating Smith’s due process rights.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the identification should have been suppressed, and the case was sent back for a potential retrial. The state of Ohio appealed the decision, asking the Supreme Court to intervene and reverse the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. The Supreme Court, however, declined to hear the case, effectively upholding the lower court’s decision.
In his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, criticized the Sixth Circuit’s application of federal law, specifically the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which limits federal courts’ ability to grant habeas corpus relief unless a state court ruling is deemed unreasonable. Thomas argued that the Sixth Circuit had misapplied the law and that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable. He also pointed out that the Sixth Circuit’s criticism of the Ohio court’s opinion-writing style, rather than its judgment, was flawed. According to Thomas, a state court is not required to explain its reasoning in detail, and the lack of explanation should not be grounds for overturning a decision.
Thomas further criticized the Sixth Circuit’s approach, calling it part of a broader pattern of errors in its handling of AEDPA cases. He contended that the court’s ruling would have significant negative consequences, both for society and the victim. A retrial would require considerable time and resources, which could be better spent on other law enforcement activities. Moreover, the passage of time since the original trial would make it more difficult to secure a conviction, potentially allowing Smith to escape justice.
Thomas also provided additional context for his dissent, suggesting that Tolliver had never been uncertain about Smith’s identity as her attacker. He claimed that Tolliver had initially failed to identify Smith because she was trying to hide her drug-dealing activities from her mother, who was present during the police interviews. Thomas argued that the Sixth Circuit had failed to consider this context and had erroneously focused on the police conduct rather than the substance of the case.
In his statement, Thomas expressed concern that the Sixth Circuit’s decision would set a dangerous precedent, undermining the ability of state courts to make decisions without excessive federal interference. He concluded that the errors made by the Sixth Circuit would lead to a costly and unnecessary retrial, which would not only harm Smith but also place a significant burden on the justice system.
